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Abstract: Which type of firm is more innovative: the decentralized, diversified corporation or 
the smaller, more narrowly focused “entrepreneurial” firm? According to one argument, diversi-
fied corporations can do more R&D because their operating units have access to an internal capi-
tal market. Other writers argue that decentralized, diversified firms over-rely on financial ac-
counting criteria to evaluate the performance of their operating units, discouraging divisional 
managers from investing in projects like R&D with long-term, uncertain payoffs. This paper uses 
a comprehensive sample of diversified and nondiversified firms from 1980 to 1999 to study the 
relationship between diversification and innovation. I find a robust negative correlation between 
diversification and R&D intensity, even when controlling for firm scale, cash flow, and invest-
ment opportunities. Industry-adjusted R&D—the difference between the R&D intensity of a di-
versified firm and the R&D intensity it would most likely have if its divisions were standalone 
firms—is negative, consistent with the hypothesis that diversification reduces innovation by dis-
couraging R&D investment. However, other evidence suggests that internal-capital-market inef-
ficiencies, rather than managerial myopia, are driving the negative relationship between diversi-
fication and innovation. 
JEL: O32, D23, G34 
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1. Introduction 
Which type of firm is more innovative: the decentralized, diversified corporation or the 
smaller, more narrowly focused “entrepreneurial” firm? According to one argument, diversified 
corporations can do more R&D because their operating units have access to an internal capital 
market. As developed by Alchian (1969), Williamson (1975), Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein 
(1994), and Stein (1997), this theory holds that internal capital markets have advantages where 
access to external funds is limited. In particular, the central office of the diversified firm can use 
informational advantages, residual control rights, and its ability to intervene selectively to allo-
cate resources within the firm better than the external capital markets would do if the divisions 
were standalone firms. These advantages could be particularly important for investments in 
R&D, where the information asymmetry between the firm and outside investors is likely to be 
greatest (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Stein, 1988). Indeed, economists have argued, at least since 
Schumpeter (1942), that firms’ R&D expenditures are constrained by the availability of internal 
finance (Kamien and Schwartz, 1978; Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; Brown, 1997).1 Because 
the subsidiaries of a diversified firm have access to the cash flows of other subsidiaries within 
the firm, as well as their own cash flows, they have potential access to more generous sources of 
internal finance. 
                                                 
1 Hall (1999, p. 5) notes that “[e]very senior executive I have interviewed in the past several years has con-
firmed that they view external finance in general, and debt finance in particular, as inappropriate for funding R&D 
investment.” Early-stage venture finance, she notes, is an exception. 
By contrast, the strategic-management literature has generally argued that unrelated diversifi-
cation is harmful to innovation. Hoskisson and Hitt (1988, 1994), Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland 
(1990), Hoskisson, Hitt, and Hill (1993), and others argue that decentralized, widely diversified 
firms over-rely on financial accounting criteria to evaluate the performance of their operating 
units. Because these firms are widely diversified, it is claimed, central managers do not have the 
expertise to evaluate the long-term potential of R&D investments by divisional managers. As a 
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result, the central office must use internal rate-of-return measures to assess divisional perfor-
mance, and this discourages divisional managers from investing in projects like R&D with long-
term, uncertain payoffs. Consequently, large, diversified enterprises suffer from a form of mana-
gerial myopia; they make relatively smaller investments in R&D and over time perform worse 
than smaller, more centralized firms. 
An influential Harvard Business Review survey in 1980 blamed managerial myopia for the 
poor performance of U.S. firms in the 1970s. “By their preference for servicing existing markets 
rather than creating new ones and by their devotion to short-term returns and ‘management by 
the numbers,’ many [U.S. managers] have effectively forsworn long-term technological superior-
ity as a competitive weapon” (Hayes and Abernathy, 1980, p. 70). Chandler (1990, p. 8) ex-
presses a similar sentiment in his assessment of the conglomerate merger wave: “More serious to 
the long-term health of American companies and industries was the diversification movement of 
the 1960s—and the chain of events it helped to set off. When senior managers chose to grow 
through diversification—to acquire businesses in which they had few if any organizational capa-
bilities to give them a competitive edge—they ignored the logic of managerial enterprise.” 
A negative relationship between diversification and R&D could also help explain the dra-
matic increase in private-sector R&D expenditures said to characterize the “new economy” (Na-
tional Science Board, 2000). Existing explanations for this trend emphasize changes in the or-
ganization of R&D, from a vertically integrated process based on proprietary standards to a more 
decentralized, more modular process relying on collaboration and open standards (Matcher, 
Mowery, and Hodges, 1999; Cockburn, Henderson, Orsenigo, and Pisano, 1999; Baldwin and 
Clark, 2000). Other studies focus on the increased importance of basic research for new product 
development in information technology and biotechnology (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Cock-
burn, Henderson, and Stern, 1999). If diversification reduces R&D, then the corporate refocusing 
movement of the 1980s and 1990s could also have contributed to the increase in private-sector 
R&D.  
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This paper assesses these claims by examining a comprehensive sample of diversified and 
nondiversified firms over a twenty-year period from 1980 to 1999, a period marked by both an 
increase in corporate focus and an increase in private sector R&D intensity. The sample includes 
the basic universe of U.S. nonfinancial corporations for which data are available on business ac-
tivities by industry segment. I find a strong, robust negative relationship between diversification 
and R&D intensity, suggesting that diversification is associated with reduced levels of innova-
tive activity. However, some findings appear inconsistent with the managerial myopia hypothe-
sis, which posits a reluctance on the part of divisional managers to invest in R&D. Instead, the 
data appear more consistent with the view that the internal capital market itself fails to provide 
adequate resources for the divisional managers to pursue a strategy of investing in innovation.  
The analysis consists of three parts. I begin by showing that R&D intensity is generally de-
creasing with the level of diversification, throughout the sample period. The negative relation-
ship between diversification and R&D is fairly stable over time and robust to the measure of di-
versification used. Moreover, this relationship generally holds even when differences in scale, 
cash flow, and investment opportunities are taken into account. These controls are particularly 
important because both R&D and diversification could be driven by other firm- or industry-
specific characteristics, both observable and unobservable. For instance, factors causing firms to 
underinvest in R&D could also cause them to diversify, resulting in an observed negative rela-
tionship between R&D and diversification even if there is no causal relationship between the 
two. By controlling for firm size, income, and investment opportunities, I can hold these observ-
able firm- and industry-specific characteristics constant while examining the relationship be-
tween R&D and diversification. I also use a fixed-effects estimator to control for unobservable 
firm-specific factors that might drive the decision to invest in innovation. In all cases, the nega-
tive relationship between R&D and diversification remains statistically and economically sig-
nificant. 
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Second, I use techniques developed in the “diversification-discount” literature in empirical 
corporate finance to construct measures of industry-adjusted R&D for diversified firms. Follow-
ing Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Servaes (1996), Rajan, Servaes, and Zin-
gales (2000), and others, I compute the difference between the R&D expenditures of a diversi-
fied firm and the R&D expenditures of a pure-play portfolio of single-segment firms in the same 
industries as the diversified firm’s divisions. This provides a measure of industry-adjusted R&D 
or pure-play innovation. Existing studies of diversification and innovation (Hoskisson and Hitt, 
1988; Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland, 1990; Cardinal and Opler, 1995; Rogers, 1999) compare 
groups of diversified firms to control groups of nondiversified firms, without controlling for the 
diversified firm’s specific activities. However, if the subsidiaries of a diversified firm are sys-
tematically different from firms in the control group—operating in different industries with dif-
ferent growth opportunities, or at a less efficient scale, for example—then such a comparison 
would lead to the conclusion that diversification reduces innovation, even if the negative relation 
between diversification and innovation has nothing to do with diversification itself. 
To address this problem, I compare measures of innovation by diversified firms with the hy-
pothetical levels of innovation those firms would have if each of their divisions was as innova-
tive as the average nondiversified firm in the division’s industry. This comparison assesses the 
effects of diversification on innovation independent of the effects of diversification per se. If di-
versification increases innovation, then the industry-adjusted R&D level of a diversified firm—
the difference between its R&D intensity and the R&D intensity of a pure-play matching portfo-
lio—should be positive. If industry-adjusted R&D is negative, then that firm would presumably 
be more innovative if its subsidiaries were standalone firms. 
The results from these calculations are consistent with the hypothesis that diversification re-
duces innovation by discouraging R&D investment, at least for some years. Specifically, I find 
an “R&D discount” ranging from −0.006 in 1980 to −0.013 in 1999. That is, in 1999 the R&D 
intensity of the average diversified firm was 1.3 percentage points lower than the R&D intensity 
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of a size- and industry-matched portfolio of nondiversified firms. (The discount does not system-
atically vary with the level of diversification, however.) Like the previous results, this finding is 
consistent with the claim that diversified firms provide insufficient incentives for divisional 
managers to invest in R&D, despite the availability of funds from the internal capital market. 
And because the portfolio-matching technique controls for industry and size, the negative rela-
tionship between R&D and diversification cannot be explained in terms of differences in indus-
try-specific differences in the innovation opportunity set. To further confirm the result, I regress 
industry-adjusted R&D on firm size, cash flow, and investment opportunities and find that the 
R&D discount is increasing in the degree of diversification. This result remains even while con-
trolling for unobservable firm-specific characteristics in a fixed-effects model, which mitigates 
the potential endogeneity between and firm’s R&D intensity and its decision to diversify.  
The above results are consistent with the myopia hypothesis. However, they are also consis-
tent with the claim that the internal capital market itself fails to provide adequate funds for divi-
sional innovation, independent of the incentives facing divisional managers. To distinguish be-
tween these two explanations, I use segment-level data on R&D and cash flow to examine the 
effects of internal-capital-market affiliation on the business unit’s commitment to innovation. 
The results here do not strongly support the myopia hypothesis. There is some evidence for R&D 
underinvestment at the smallest segments of diversified firms, but no evidence for underinvest-
ment at the largest segments. Managerial myopia is more likely at large segments, while reliance 
on the internal capital market to fund innovation is more likely at small segments. This suggests 
that internal-capital-market inefficiencies, rather than managerial myopia, may be driving the 
negative relationship between diversification and innovation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the hypotheses moti-
vating the analysis along with the segment-level data provided by Compustat. Preliminary com-
parisons of R&D intensity among different types of firms are presented in Section 3. Section 4 
gives the results of the portfolio-simulation technique for estimating industry-adjusted R&D for 
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multiple-segment firms. Section 5 presents an analysis of segment-level R&D and cash flow 
data. Conclusions and directions for future research are given in Section 6. 
2. Hypotheses and data  
Several papers in financial economics examine incentives of managers to engage in R&D.2 
Often, R&D itself is not the main variable of interest in these studies. Rather, R&D is used as an 
example of an investment with long-term, uncertain returns. If managers are myopic, sacrificing 
potential long-term earnings and growth opportunities for short-term profits, they will tend to 
avoid investments like R&D. While good for managers in the short term, this tendency can hurt 
the long-term performance of the firm. In Stein’s (1988) model, the existence of an active take-
over market exacerbates managerial myopia, so firms facing a takeover threat will reduce 
long-term investments like R&D. He suggests that firms that can construct barriers to takeover 
(“shark repellants”) will reduce myopia. However, Hall (1988, 1999) finds that mergers did not 
generally reduce R&D.3 Moreover, Meulbroek et al. (1990) find that firms do not increase their 
R&D expenditures after constructing a shark repellant, as Stein’s model predicts. Other studies 
have found that antitakeover amendments generally seem to protect incumbent management 
rather than reduce myopia.4 
Hoskisson and Hitt (1988, 1994), Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland (1990), and Hoskisson, Hitt, 
and Hill (1993) argue that myopia is a larger problem for divisional managers in a diversified 
firm. Such firms, they claim, rely on financial rather than “strategic” controls to evaluate divi-
sional performance. Strategic controls evaluate divisional managers based on their contribu-
tions—often subjectively defined—to an overall strategic plan (Goold and Campbell, 1987). In-
                                                 
2 This literature focuses on agency conflicts within the firm, assuming that managers will not always take ac-
tions that maximize the value of the firm. A related literature in industrial organization (surveyed by Cohen and 
Levin, 1991) asks how market structure, patent policy, and other factors affect the levels of R&D that do maximize 
firm value. 
3 Hall (1980) finds no effect of mergers on post-merger R&D at U.S. publicly traded corporations during the 
1980s; Hall (1999) finds a small, negative effect, but it is not statistically significant.  
4 See DeAngelo and Rice (1983) and Jarrell and Poulsen (1987). 
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formation is exchanged between divisional and senior managers through both formal and infor-
mal interaction, and senior managers need substantial information about divisional activities and 
profit opportunities. Financial controls, by contrast, evaluate divisional performance based on 
objective performance criteria such as return-on-investment ratios. Divisions are treated as inde-
pendent business units whose performance is rated relative to corporate-level financial targets. 
Unlike strategic controls, financial controls can be applied without detailed knowledge of indi-
vidual business-unit activities. Because strategic controls are feasible only within more central-
ized structures, highly diversified corporations will tend to rely on financial controls.5 
The use of financial controls offers potential advantages, however. In particular, this mode of 
organization releases the central office from responsibility for day-to-day business-unit activi-
ties, freeing central managers to focus on long-term strategic goals (such as acquisitions and 
overall corporate structure) (Williamson, 1975). Hoskisson and Hitt (1988, 1994) and Hoskisson, 
Hitt, and Hill (1993) argue, however, that reliance on financial controls discourages divisional 
managers from investing in long-term, uncertain projects such as R&D. Hoskisson and Hitt 
(1988) find that diversified U.S. multidivisional or “M-form” firms in the 1970s had lower R&D 
intensities than less diversified, unitary or “U-form” firms. Rogers (1999) examine a sample of 
large Australian firms from the 1990s and find that more focused firms tend to have higher R&D 
intensities, though Cardinal and Opler (1995) find no statistically discernible effect of diversifi-
cation on innovative efficiency in U.S. firms during the 1980s.6 
If diversification encourages myopia by divisional managers, then diversified firms will have 
lower R&D intensities, controlling for other characteristics that affect the firm’s propensity to 
                                                 
5 As Baysinger and Hoskisson (1989, p. 313) point out, the choice of control system is continuous, not discrete, 
as firms may choose a mix of financial and strategic controls. A single-business firm will tend to rely exclusively on 
strategic controls; a “related-diversified” firm will use both financial and strategic controls; an “unrelated-
diversified” firm will generally eschew strategic controls altogether. In the present context, this implies that the de-
gree to which the firm relies on financial controls is an increasing function of the level of diversification. Of course, 
it is impossible to observe the sample firms’ control systems directly. 
6 Barringer and Bluedorn (1999) develop a composite index of “corporate entrepreneurship,” comprising meas-
ures of innovative intensity, risk taking, and other strategic decisions, and show that corporate entrepreneurship is 
negatively correlated with the use of financial controls. 
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invest in innovation. R&D underinvestment should be visible at the level of the firm, as well as 
the level of the individual division. On the other hand, particular divisions of a diversified firm 
may underinvest in R&D not because the divisional managers are reluctant to pursue long-term 
projects, but rather because the division is unable to obtain the necessary funding from corporate 
headquarters—i.e., because the internal capital market performs poorly relative to external capi-
tal markets.  
Evidence on the value of internal capital markets is mixed, despite a growing literature in 
empirical corporate finance. Early studies by Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), 
Servaes (1996), and Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) found that diversified firms were val-
ued at a discount relative to more specialized firms in the 1980s and early 1990s. Lang and Stulz 
(1994), for example, find an average industry-adjusted discount—the difference between a di-
versified firm’s q and its pure-play q—ranging from −0.35 for two-segment firms to −0.49 for 
five-or-more-segment firms. Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) and Comment and Jarrell 
(1995) document positive stock-price reactions to refocusing announcements.7 The apparent 
poor relative performance of internal capital markets has been explained in terms of rent seeking 
by divisional managers (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000), bargaining problems within the firm (Ra-
jan, Servaes, and Zingales, 1997) or bureaucratic rigidity (Shin and Stulz, 1998). For these rea-
sons, it is argued, corporate managers fail to allocate investment resources to their highest-
valued uses, both in the short and long term.  
On the other hand, as pointed out by Campa and Kedia (2002), Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf 
(2002), Chevalier (2004), and Villalonga (2004), diversified firms may trade at a discount not 
because diversification destroys value, but because undervalued firms tend to diversify. Diversi-
fication is endogenous and the same factors that cause firms to be undervalued may also cause 
them to diversify. Campa and Kedia (2002), for example, show that correcting for selection bias 
                                                 
7 Matsusaka (1993), Hubbard and Palia (1999), and Klein (2001) argue, by contrast, that diversification may 
have created value during the 1960s and early 1970s by creating efficient internal capital markets. 
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using panel data and fixed effects and two-stage selection models substantially reduces the ob-
served discount (and can even turn it into a premium).8 
This strand of research suggests an alternate explanation for R&D underinvestment at diver-
sified firms. Even if divisional managers are not mypoic, they may be unable to engage in R&D 
because the internal capital market does not make sufficient funds available. If the internal capi-
tal market is highly inefficient, financing R&D with funds generated from other divisions could 
be even more difficult than financing R&D with external finance. For this reason, divisions of 
diversified firms could do less R&D than standalone firms with similar characteristics, even ab-
sent myopia by divisional managers. Section 5 uses segment-level data on R&D and cash flow 
to cast light on these competing explanations for R&D underinvestment.  
Line-of-business data for U.S. corporations have been available since the late 1970s,9 and 
Compustat provides these data in its business industry segments file.10 I retrieve firm- and seg-
ment-level data on R&D, sales, assets, cash flow, and q for the years 1980 to 1999. I use the ac-
tive and research files of Compustat, so the sample includes firms that were subsequently de-
listed due to acquisition, bankruptcy, or liquidation. I exclude segments in finance (SIC 6000–
6999) and regulated utilities (SIC 4900 and 4999). To keep the dataset manageable I also ex-
clude segments with less than $1 million in annual sales (the Compustat segment file already ex-
cludes segments contributing less than 10 percent of the firm’s annual sales). 
                                                 
8 There are also important data and measurement problems. Most studies use Tobin’s q to measure divisional in-
vestment opportunities, but it is marginal q—which may not be closely correlated with observable q—that drives 
investment (Whited, 2001). SIC codes are also typically used to measure diversification and to identify industries, 
but the SIC system contains significant errors (Kahle and Walkling, 1996) and cannot reliably distinguish between 
related and unrelated activities (Teece, Dosi, Rumelt, and Winter, 1994; Klein and Lien, 2005). 
9 FASB-SFAS No. 14 and SEC Regulation S-K require that firms report information on their business segments 
for fiscal years ending after December 15, 1977. The Compustat business industry files provide data on sales, operat-
ing income, depreciation, capital expenditures, assets, employees, and R&D by industry segment. The segments are 
identified by 4-digit SIC codes. FASB-SFAS No. 131, released in 1997, amends No. 14 to require that firms report 
information on “operating segments,” defined according to how the firm’s businesses are managed. The amendment 
was issued partly in response to complaints that too many firms were reporting themselves to be in a single “indus-
try.” 
10 Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1994), Shin and Stulz (1998), Wulf (1998), and Campa and Kedia (2002) 
also use the Compustat business industry segment files. 
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Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1. The changes in R&D intensity (the ratio of 
R&D to total assets) and diversification over time suggest a negative relationship between diver-
sification and innovation. Average R&D intensity for the sample firms went from 3.94 percent in 
1980 to 6.78 percent in 1985, 7.75 percent in 1990, 10.24 percent in 1995, and 10.93 percent in 
1999. At the same time, the level of diversification was generally decreasing. The average num-
ber of industry segments for the sample firms fell from 2.19 in 1980 to 1.86 in 1985, 1.69 in 
1990, and 1.48 in 1995, reflecting the corporate refocusing movement of the 1980s and early 
1990s. The average number of industry segments rose in 1999, however, to 1.98, presumably in 
response to a FASB rule change enacted in 1997 and requiring more precise definitions of seg-
ments.11 
[Table 1 about here] 
Admittedly, the number of industry segments is a crude measure of diversification. Another 
frequently used measure is a Herfindahl index weighted by segment sales or segment assets. Ta-
ble 1 also provides the mean and median values for segment sales–weighted Herfindahl indexes 
for each of the sample firms. The Herfindahl is computed as the sum of squared segment sales 
divided by the square of total firm sales. A single-segment firm will have a Herfindahl of 100 
percent, while a firm with four equally sized segments will have a Herfindahl of 25 percent. The 
Herfindahls provide a better measure of diversification than the number of industry segments. 
For instance, a firm with four evenly weighted segments is more diversified than a firm with one 
large segment and three small segments, though both have four industry segments. 
Table 1 shows that the average segment sales–weighted Herfindahl has generally been rising 
over time, indicating a decrease in the average level of diversification. (Again, there is a slight 
increase in average diversification between 1995 and 1999.) This pattern is consistent with that 
observed using the simpler measure of diversification, the number of industry segments. 
                                                 
11 See footnote 9 above. 
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3. Basic results 
Using the sample described above, I first compute average and median values of R&D inten-
sity for firms with one, two, three, four, five, and six or more segments. Table 2 reports these 
computations. The results are consistent with managerial myopia: mean and median R&D inten-
sities are highest for single-segment firms and generally (though not monotonically) declining in 
the number of industry segments. This pattern is roughly consistent throughout the five cross-
sections, even while average R&D intensity for all firms in a given year is increasing throughout 
the sample period.  
[Table 2 about here] 
As mentioned above, factors other than corporate refocusing—open standards, modularity, 
and science-based discovery, for instance—have been identified as possible sources of increased 
R&D expenditures over time. Table 2 suggests that these practices have been used disproportion-
ately by nondiversified firms. Among single-segment firms, for example, average R&D intensity 
rose gradually from 4.4 percent in 1980 to 6.6 percent in 1985, 7.7 percent in 1990, and 9.7 per-
cent in 1995. (The 1999 results must be interpreted with caution, given the change in the defini-
tion of industry segments described previously.) Among two-segment firms, by contrast, average 
R&D intensity rose slightly between 1980 and 1985 (from 3.4 percent to 4.2 percent) but re-
mained roughly constant afterward (through 1995). The same is true for firms with three, four, 
five, and six or more segments. For some types of firm, R&D intensity actually declined slightly 
over the sample period. This suggests that the drivers of increased R&D most often mentioned in 
the literature on innovation apply only to focused firms.  
I next repeat the exercise, this time using the segment sales–weighted Herfindahl index (H) 
as the measure of diversification. Table 3 reports the results. Following Lang and Stulz (1994), I 
divide the firms in each year into five categories: H = 1 (single-segment firms), 0.8 ≤ H < 1, 0.6 
≤ H < 0.8, 0.4 ≤ H < 0.6, and H < 0.4. The results are similar to, but weaker than, the results pre-
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sented in Table 2. Single-segment firms have the highest R&D intensities and the most diversi-
fied firms have the lowest R&D intensities, though the pattern is somewhat muddled in-between. 
Multiple-segment firms with one or more large segments and several smaller segments (0.8 ≤ H 
< 1) generally have lower R&D intensities than multiple-segment firms with several similarly 
sized segments (0.6 ≤ H < 0.8). Still, these data are consistent with the view that diversification 
reduces innovation by rewarding myopic behavior on the part of divisional managers. 
[Table 3 about here] 
These simple comparisons, while suggestive, do not control for the possibility that firms with 
different numbers or distributions of segments differ in other ways, such as size, age, overall 
firm cash flow, and investment opportunities. Moreover, these comparisons do not account for 
the endogeneity of the diversification decision itself. As shown by Campa and Kedia (2002), 
Villalonga (2004), and others, firms that diversify are different from firms that remain focused. 
The same factors that cause firms to diversify could also cause them to underinvest in R&D, 
leading to a (spurious) observed negative correlation between R&D and diversification.  
To obtain a more precise measure of the effects of diversification on R&D, I run a series of 
panel regressions of R&D investment on a diversification measure, a constant, and three control 
variables, firm size, cash flow margin, and q. Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of 
net sales. Diversified firms are usually larger than nondiversified firms, so the size control is im-
portant. Cash flow margin is measured as income available for the common plus depreciation 
less income taxes paid, plus R&D, all divided by net sales. R&D is added to the numerator be-
cause firms treat R&D as an expense (see also Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994). I follow Smith 
and Watts (1992) in computing q as the value of common and preferred stock plus total assets 
minus shareholder’s equity, all divided by total assets. As is common in investment–cash-flow 
regressions, I include q to control for differences in investment opportunities. The dependent 
variable, R&D, is scaled by total assets. Due to the change in the definition of an industry seg-
ment for years beginning in 1998, I use only the 1980–97 section of the sample. 
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Table 4 reports the results of these regressions. I use simple OLS, a model with firm-fixed ef-
fects (to explore the effects of within-firm variation in the independent variables), and a model 
with firm-specific random effects (variance components). All the models include year-fixed ef-
fects, which proxy for changes in the cost of capital over time. Diversification is measured as 
1−H where H is the Herfindahl index of diversification, as defined above. The coefficient on this 
variable is negative and highly significant in all three specifications. The coefficient on cash 
flow margin is positive and highly significant, documenting the importance of internal finance 
for R&D. 
[Table 4 about here] 
As in Campa and Kedia (2002), the coefficient on the diversification index is smallest (in ab-
solute value) in the model with firm-fixed effects. This suggests that unobservable firm-specific 
characteristics explain part of the “R&D discount”: the characteristics that cause firms to diver-
sify may also cause them to underinvest in R&D. However, because the within-firm relationship 
between diversification and innovation is still negative and significant, unobserved heterogeneity 
is not likely to be the primary driver of the results.  
Moreover, the fixed-effects specification helps control for unobservable firm-specific charac-
teristics that lead firms to be diversified, to the extent that these characteristics are constant over 
time. This mitigates the endogeneity problem emphasized by Campa and Kedia (2002), Graham, 
Lemmon, and Wolf (2002), Chevalier (2004), and Villalonga (2004). Fixed effects do not com-
pletely control for endogeneity, of course; the results could still be biased by unobservable firm-
specific characteristics that vary through time. For instance, a given firm may adjust its R&D 
intensity in light of changing market conditions, conditions that may also affect the decision to 
diversify. However, these conditions are likely highly correlated with Tobin’s q, which is in-
cluded as a regressor, so the negative coefficient on the diversification index suggests that R&D 
and diversification are negatively correlated even when controlling for changes in the firm’s in-
vestment opportunity set over time. Unlike the diversification-discount literature, the dependent 
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variable here is a choice variable, the firm’s R&D expenditures controlling for (exogenous) 
changes in opportunities. For this reason the analysis here is relatively free from the endogeneity 
problems that are critical in studies of diversification’s effect on firm value. 
In short, even when differences in firm size, cash flow, and investment opportunities are 
taken into account, higher levels of diversification are still associated with lower R&D intensi-
ties. This finding is consistent with the myopia hypothesis. However, the results presented in Ta-
bles 2, 3, and 4 do not directly test the version of the myopia hypothesis advanced by Hoskisson 
and Hitt (1988, 1994), Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland (1990), and Hoskisson, Hitt, and Hill (1993). 
Their claim is that diversified multidivisional or M-form firms will do less R&D than nondiver-
sified unitary or U-form firms.12 Lacking specific data on organizational structure, however, the 
analysis presented here only compares single-segment firms and multiple-segment firms. While 
the multiple-segment firms in my sample are all almost certainly organized as M-form corpora-
tions, the single-segment “nondiversified” firms in my sample are themselves publicly traded 
corporations, many of which may also be organized as M-form firms. The results presented here 
show only that large, multiple-segment firms have higher R&D intensities than large, sin-
gle-segment firms. 
4. Measures of industry-adjusted R&D 
The analysis reported in Table 4 controls for firm size and cash flow. It does not, however, 
control for the specific industries in which the diversified firms are active. If multiple-segment 
firms tend to cluster in low- or medium-tech industries, then regressions of R&D on diversifica-
tion measures will report a negative relationship between conglomeration and innovation, even if 
the relationship has nothing to do with the organizational structure of a diversified firm. More-
over, there is evidence that firms tended to diversify into low-R&D industries during the 1960s 
                                                 
12 A similar claim is that unrelated, or “broad-spectrum” diversification is harmful for innovation while related, 
or “narrow-spectrum” diversification is not [refs]. Relatedness is difficult to define, however, using SIC codes to 
characterize industries. The survival measure of relatedness proposed by Teece et al. (1994) is an attractive alterna-
tive, but is difficult to compute for a large sample of firms. 
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and 1970s (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987). To assess the effect of organizational structure on 
R&D intensity, it is necessary to control for industry. 
Because the sample includes multi-industry firms, simply adding industry dummies to the 
pooled OLS regressions reported in Table 4 is not appropriate. Instead, I adopt a portfo-
lio-matching technique similar to that used in Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), 
Servaes (1996), and Klein (2001) to control for industry effects. This technique has not been 
used before in the literature on innovation and firm structure. For each multiple-segment firm in 
each year of the sample, I extract the 4-digit SIC code and sales for each industry segment. For 
each segment-year I search for matching firms from the set of all single-segment firms in the 
Compustat segment files meeting two criteria: (1) they are classified by Compustat as having in 
that year the same primary 2-digit SIC code as the diversified firm’s segment, and (2) they have 
sales of at least 50 percent, and no more than 150 percent, of the sales of the diversified firm’s 
segment.13  
Using these criteria I identify, on average, 11.9 matching firms per segment-year. I was able 
to match over 90 percent of all segment-years in the sample. I then compute the median R&D 
intensity for all firms matching a particular segment-year, and construct sales-weighted averages 
of R&D intensity for each firm in each year. The final dataset thus contains exactly parallel sam-
ples of multiple-segment firms and matching portfolios of standalone firms, matched at the divi-
sional level by year, size, and industry.  
To measure industry-adjusted R&D I compare the matched portfolio observations with the 
diversified firms’ observations. That is, suppose diversified firm i has total sales Xi, segments 
j = 1, ... , n, and segment sales xij. Industry-adjusted R&D intensity R is thus given by                   
                     where Ri is the diversified firm’s own R&D intensity, rij is the median R&D inten-
sity of segment j’s matching firms, and wij = xij/Xi is the weight assigned to division j. Industry-
                                                 
13 The results are generally robust to changes in the matching procedure, such as matching at the 3-digit level or 
applying a tighter or looser size criterion. 
 ,wr -R jiji
n
j=1
i ∑
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adjusted R&D can be interpreted as the difference between the diversified firm’s own R&D in-
tensity and the R&D intensity it would have most likely had if each of its divisions were as 
R&D-intensive as the median standalone firm in the same industry and about the same size. 
Table 5 presents mean and median industry-adjusted R&D for all multiple-segment firms, 
and then separately for firms with two, three, four, five, and six or more segments. Statistical sig-
nificance is given by a paired t-test for the means and a signed-rank test for the medians. The 
first column reveals an “R&D discount”—analogous to the diversification discount for multiple-
segment firms—ranging from −0.006 in 1980 to −0.013 in 1999. That is, in 1999 the R&D inten-
sity of the average diversified firm was 1.3 percentage points lower than the R&D intensity of a 
size- and industry-matched portfolio of nondiversified firms. Like the previous results, this find-
ing is consistent with the claim that diversified firms provide insufficient incentives for divi-
sional managers to invest in R&D, despite the availability of funds from the internal capital mar-
ket. And because the portfolio-matching technique controls for industry and size, the negative 
relationship between R&D and diversification cannot be explained in terms of differences in in-
dustry-specific differences in the innovation opportunity set. This approach also controls for 
other industry characteristics that could affect firms’ incentives to do R&D, such as industry 
concentration, product life-cycles, the availability of licensing or other sharing arrangements, 
and so on. 
[Table 5 about here] 
The form of managerial myopia described by Hoskisson and Hitt (1988), Hitt, Hoskisson, 
and Ireland (1990), and Hoskisson, Hitt, and Hill (1993) results from the use of financial controls 
for evaluating divisional managers. This suggests that R&D underinvestment should be more 
pronounced at the most diversified firms, which are the firms most likely to use financial con-
trols. However, the data presented in Table 5 do not bear this out, as R&D underinvestment is 
not generally increasing in the number of industry segments. Indeed, in the 1985 and 1995 cross 
sections R&D underinvestment is most pronounced among two-segment firms. 
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I next check to see if the negative industry-adjusted R&D figures could be driven by differ-
ences in size, cash flow, and investment opportunities between diversified and nondiversified 
firms. Table 6 reports the results of panel regressions of industry-adjusted R&D investment on a 
diversification measure (1−H), firm size (log sales), cash flow margin, and q (both measured as 
before) for the years 1980 to 1997. For these regressions I include single-segment as well as 
multiple-segment firms.14 As seen in the table, the coefficient on the diversification measure is 
negative and highly significant, indicating that the negative relationship between diversification 
and R&D intensity documented in Table 4 remains even when controlling for the specific indus-
tries in which diversified firms are active. As in Table 4, the industry-adjusted R&D discount is 
smallest in the model with firm-fixed effects, suggesting that unobservable firm-specific charac-
teristics explain part, but not all, of the negative relationship between diversification and R&D. 
 [Table 6 about here] 
Because R&D, unlike market value, is ultimately a choice variable, this analysis is relatively 
free from the endogeneity problems plaguing the diversification-discount literature. It is unlikely 
that firms with low industry-adjusted R&D intensities subsequently diversify to increase their 
R&D, leading to a negative correlation between diversification and R&D even when the former 
has no effect on the latter. Moreover, the use of industry-adjusted R&D figures controls for the 
concern that specialized, high-R&D firms could diversify into low-R&D industries, implying a 
negative correlation between R&D and diversification when the result is driven by selection, not 
organizational form. If diversification does not affect R&D, then a firm’s industry-adjusted R&D 
expenditures will not change as it adds or subtracts industry segments.  
                                                 
14 Because these same single-segment firms are used to construct the pure-play portfolios, the median value of 
industry-adjusted R&D or the single-segment firms is zero. 
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5. Analysis of segment-level R&D and cash flow  
The analysis described above used only three of the segment-level data items provided by the 
Compustat segment files: segment sales, segment SIC, and the number of segments per form. 
Compustat also provides R&D and cash flow information for each segment; analysis of these 
data provide further insight into the relationship between diversification and innovation. Here I 
follow Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1994) in assuming that R&D investment decisions re 
made at the level of the business unit, not the firm. Internal capital markets provide resources 
that can be used to invest in innovation, but it is up to the managers of the business units to use 
those resources appropriately.  
To examine the differences between standalone firms and business units of diversified corpo-
rations, I pool the Compustat data on single-segment firms with the segment-level data for diver-
sified firms and regressed segment-level R&D-to-assets on segment size (measured as the log of 
the segment’s sales), the segment’s cash flow margin (defined as the segment’s operating income 
plus depreciation plus R&D, all divided by segment sales), a constant, and a dummy indicating 
affiliation with an internal capital market—i.e., those segments that are subsidiaries of a diversi-
fied corporation. I also include a series of industry dummies at the 2-digit SIC level. Like Shin 
and Stulz (1998), I analyze separately the smallest and the largest segments of multiple-segment 
firms. This allows more precise inferences about the operation of the internal capital market. It 
also handles the problem that diversified firms are more likely than nondiversified firms to have 
separate R&D centers (see Cardinal and Opler, 1995), making it difficult to draw inferences 
about divisional R&D decisions using firm-wide R&D levels. (Unfortunately, the existing myo-
pia literature relies almost exclusively on firm-level data.) 
Results of these cross-sectional regressions are presented in Table 7. The results in Panel A 
use all single-segment firms plus the smallest segments of multiple-segment firms, while the re-
sults in Panel B use all single-segment firms plus the largest segments of multiple-segment firms. 
The results do not strongly support the myopia hypothesis. In both panels and in all five cross-
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sections the coefficients on the dummy for internal-capital-market affiliation is negative, though 
it is statistically significant only in two of the cross sections, and only for the regressions includ-
ing the smallest segments of diversified firms. In other words, there is some evidence that small 
segments of diversified firms have lower R&D intensities than standalone segments, controlling 
for segment size, cash flow, and industry, but this relationship does not hold for larger segments.  
 [Table 7 about here] 
This is inconsistent with the claim that divisional managers are reluctant to invest in R&D 
because their performance is tied exclusively to short-term profit targets. Financial controls are 
more common at large subsidiaries, whose activities are frequently complex and difficult for out-
siders to assess, than at small subsidiaries, which can be more easily monitored (Gates and Egel-
hoff, 1986). Just as startups in emerging industries rely on venture capitalists for funding, guid-
ance, and evaluation, small segments of diversified corporations are more likely to rely on the 
corporate office for these same functions. If R&D underinvestment is driven by myopia among 
divisional managers, then underinvestment should generally be a more serious problem at large 
segments rather than small segments. 
If R&D underinvestment is driven by internal-capital-market inefficiencies, however, then 
smaller segments—which are more dependent on funding from the corporate office than larger 
firms—should be the most myopic. Larger segments are more likely to generate sufficient cash 
flows to finance R&D even without the support of an internal capital market. Similarly, Wulf 
(1998) argues that large divisions are more likely to have informational advantages that can be 
exploited through influence activities to extract additional resources from the central office, lead-
ing to underinvestment by the smallest segments. The results of Table 7 are consistent with the 
idea that small segments do less R&D than standalone peers because some of their cash flows 
are diverted to support other activities within the firm, while large segments are able to prevent 
such outflows.  
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Further evidence comes from the relationship between R&D intensity and the within-firm 
variance of industry investment opportunities. Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) argue that the 
greater the diversity of divisional resources and investment opportunities, the more likely that 
corporate resources will be shifted in the wrong direction, i.e., from divisions with more re-
sources and more desirable investment opportunities to those with fewer resources and less de-
sirable investment opportunities. In their model, the corporate office allocates resources to pro-
jects but cannot commit to the ex post division of the surplus. Managers of divisions with more 
resources or better investment opportunities than other divisions may thus favor “defensive” in-
vestments that offer lower returns, but allow them to keep more of the surplus. Firm-level in-
vestment will then be more efficient the more similar are divisional resources and opportunities. 
Using a panel of diversified firms the 1980s and early 1990s, they show that firm value is nega-
tively related to the within-firm variation in divisional investment opportunities (proxied by size-
weighted industry q). 
To see if this form of internal-capital-market inefficiency affects R&D intensity I return to 
the firm-level measures of R&D and diversification and compute, for each firm, the variance of 
industry-adjusted segment q and use this as an additional regressor. Here I use only the multiple-
segment firms in the sample. Results are presented in Table 8. As seen in the table, industry-
adjusted R&D intensity is decreasing in the within-firm variance of industry investment oppor-
tunities. This suggests that the greater the potential for intra-firm conflicts over the allocation of 
resources, the lower the firm’s commitment to investments in innovation, controlling for firm 
size, industry, cash flow, and the firm’s overall investment opportunities. Again, these results 
seem more consistent with an inefficient internal-capital-markets explanation than an explana-
tion based on managerial myopia. 
[Table 8 about here] 
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6.  Conclusions and directions for future research 
 This paper shows that diversified firms have lower R&D intensities than nondiversified 
firms, even when controlling for differences in firm size, cash flow, and the distribution of ac-
tivities across industries. Moreover, R&D intensity is generally declining in the level of diversi-
fication. This suggests that the corporate refocusing movement of the 1980s and early 1990s 
could be a driver of the recent surge in private-sector R&D. Looking within individual segments, 
R&D underinvestment appears to be most pronounced among the smallest segments. This sug-
gests that inefficient internal capital markets, rather than managerial myopia, may be driving the 
negative relationship between diversification and R&D. 
These results are preliminary, and much more work remains to be done. The analysis re-
ported here considers a single measure of innovation, R&D investment. Of course, R&D is not a 
measure of innovation per se, but rather a measure of the input into the innovative process. An 
alternative approach would look at patents, an indicator of the output of that process. For exam-
ple, patents eventually granted per unit of R&D can be interpreted as a measure of the productiv-
ity of R&D. Of course, patent data have limitations as well. Patents measure the technological 
potential of an innovation, not its economic importance. Many innovations are not patentable, 
and many patentable innovations are not patented. Moreover, patents are correlated with factors 
other than pure innovation. For example, process innovations are much less likely to be patented 
than product innovations; large firms may be more likely to patent than individual entrepreneurs; 
and patent propensity varies widely by industry. Still, comparison of the present results with re-
sults using patent measures should be instructive. More generally, the analysis could be ex-
panded by using broader measures of “corporate entrepreneurship” such as risk-taking, and the 
introduction of innovative organizational practices (Barringer and Bluedorn, 1999). 
I also hope to extend the analysis through time and across countries. A companion paper 
(Klein, 2004) looks at the relationship between diversification and innovation during the con-
glomerate merger wave of 1960s, and the relationship between organizational structure, innova-
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tion, and long-term firm performance. I also intend to do some cross-country comparisons of the 
relationships explored in these papers. Corporate governance and managerial incentive structures 
are very different in Continental Europe, Japan, and elsewhere, and it may be instructive to com-
pare the effects of diversification on innovation in the U.S. with its effects in alternative institu-
tional settings.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Sample includes all firms on Compustat industrial, full coverage, and research files for which industry-segment in-
formation was available.  
 
Year  1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 
      
Number of firms  1709 2465 3468 5667 4586 
      
Total assets Mean 1153  1331  1877  1741  2190  
   ($ millions) Median 104  89  93  77  145  
      
R&D-to-assets ratio Mean 3.94% 6.78% 7.75% 10.24% 10.93% 
   (percent) Median 2.03% 3.22% 3.18% 4.00% 5.01% 
      
Cash flow margin Mean 5.13% 3.76% 3.68% 3.35% 0.95% 
   (percent) Median 3.80% 4.09% 4.58% 5.08% 4.62% 
      
Investment rate Mean 2.13% 2.31% 2.33% 2.21% 1.33% 
   (percent) Median 0.21% 0.24% 0.20% 0.29% 0.18% 
      
      
Number of segments Mean 2.19 1.86 1.69 1.48 1.98 
   (numbers) Median 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
      
Sales-weighted Herfindahl Mean 68.80% 76.58% 82.04% 87.19% 78.33% 
   (percent) Median 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
      
      
Dummy for missing R&D Mean 0.516 0.486 0.478 0.459 0.430 
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Table 2: R&D Intensity by Number of Industry Segments 
 
Average and median R&D intensity (R&D divided by total assets) by number of industry segments. Includes obser-
vations with usable R&D data only.  
  
 
 
Segments  
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 or more  
 
 
 
    
 
 
  
1980 
 
 
    
 
 
  
mean 
 
0.044 
 
0.034 
 
0.022 
 
0.029 
 
0.022 
 
0.021  
median 
 
0.026 
 
0.022 
 
0.019 
 
0.017 
 
0.017 
 
0.013  
std dev 
 
0.064 
 
0.034 
 
0.024 
 
0.030 
 
0.020 
 
0.017  
n 
 
414 
 
120 
 
116 
 
92 
 
49 
 
37  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1985 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
mean 
 
0.066 
 
0.042 
 
0.032 
 
0.028 
 
0.031 
 
0.026  
median 
 
0.041 
 
0.026 
 
0.019 
 
0.019 
 
0.020 
 
0.012  
std dev 
 
0.092 
 
0.053 
 
0.036 
 
0.027 
 
0.031 
 
0.026  
n 
 
791 
 
183 
 
125 
 
97 
 
42 
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1990 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
mean 
 
0.077 
 
0.040 
 
0.034 
 
0.029 
 
0.030 
 
0.020  
median 
 
0.043 
 
0.020 
 
0.015 
 
0.018 
 
0.017 
 
0.009  
std dev 
 
0.107 
 
0.054 
 
0.054 
 
0.031 
 
0.038 
 
0.027  
n 
 
1279 
 
207 
 
133 
 
94 
 
45 
 
42  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1995 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
mean 
 
0.097 
 
0.042 
 
0.031 
 
0.028 
 
0.027 
 
0.027  
median 
 
0.047 
 
0.019 
 
0.018 
 
0.015 
 
0.015 
 
0.021  
std dev 
 
0.138 
 
0.065 
 
0.044 
 
0.033 
 
0.033 
 
0.026  
n 
 
2429 
 
279 
 
172 
 
85 
 
43 
 
39  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
mean 
 
0.122 
 
0.088 
 
0.057 
 
0.038 
 
0.043 
 
0.040  
median 
 
0.063 
 
0.046 
 
0.028 
 
0.016 
 
0.023 
 
0.022  
std dev 
 
0.165 
 
0.111 
 
0.073 
 
0.052 
 
0.056 
 
0.068  
n 
 
1643 
 
272 
 
330 
 
187 
 
87 
 
75 
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 Table 3: R&D Intensity by Herfindahl Index of Diversification 
 
Average and median R&D intensity  (R&D divided by total assets) by Herdindahl index of diversification. The Her-
findahl index is computed as the sum of squared segment sales divided by the square of total firm sales. Includes 
observations with usable R&D data only.  
  
 
 
Herfindahl index weighted by segment sales  
 
 
H=1 
 
0.8≤H<1 
 
0.6≤H<0.8 
 
0.4≤H<0.6 
 
H<0.4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1980 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
mean 
 
0.043 
 
0.014 
 
0.030 
 
0.028 
 
0.028  
median 
 
0.025 
 
0.005 
 
0.020 
 
0.016 
 
0.020  
std dev 
 
0.073 
 
0.018 
 
0.030 
 
0.031 
 
0.025  
n 
 
419 
 
23 
 
84 
 
147 
 
155  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1985 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
mean 
 
0.066 
 
0.028 
 
0.040 
 
0.033 
 
0.033  
median 
 
0.041 
 
0.013 
 
0.028 
 
0.018 
 
0.024  
std dev 
 
0.092 
 
0.033 
 
0.039 
 
0.044 
 
0.031  
n 
 
800 
 
46 
 
96 
 
172 
 
152  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1990 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
mean 
 
0.077 
 
0.039 
 
0.040 
 
0.032 
 
0.031  
median 
 
0.042 
 
0.009 
 
0.019 
 
0.016 
 
0.022  
std dev 
 
0.106 
 
0.065 
 
0.051 
 
0.053 
 
0.032  
n 
 
1296 
 
45 
 
111 
 
188 
 
160  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1995 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
mean 
 
0.097 
 
0.041 
 
0.040 
 
0.035 
 
0.029  
median 
 
0.046 
 
0.007 
 
0.020 
 
0.018 
 
0.022  
std dev 
 
0.138 
 
0.092 
 
0.051 
 
0.048 
 
0.028  
n 
 
2446 
 
70 
 
147 
 
235 
 
149  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
mean 
 
0.120 
 
0.053 
 
0.062 
 
0.063 
 
0.043  
median 
 
0.062 
 
0.022 
 
0.024 
 
0.029 
 
0.023  
std dev 
 
0.164 
 
0.068 
 
0.094 
 
0.091 
 
0.057  
n 
 
1682 
 
117 
 
221 
 
359 
 
215 
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 Table 4: Panel Regressions of R&D on Diversification and Control Variables, 1980–97 
 
Dependent variable is R&D divided by total assets. Diversification is measured as 1−H, where H is a sales-weighted 
Herfindahl index of diversification. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors given in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The panel excludes firms with less 
than $100 million in annual sales. All specifications include year-fixed effects.  
 
 Total Within-firm Variance components 
    
Constant 0.0274*** 0.0712*** 0.0431 *** 
 (0.0025) (0.0130) (0.0057 ) 
    
Diversification index −0.0046*** −0.0029*** −0.0035 *** 
 (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0014 ) 
    
Log(sales) −0.0032*** 0.0007  −0.0008 
 (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0008 ) 
    
Cash flow margin 0.2637*** 0.0125*** 0.0271 ** 
 (0.0115) (0.0033) (0.0120 ) 
    
Tobin’s q 0.0056*** −0.0004  0.0002 
 (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0005 ) 
    
R2 0.304 0.886 0.009 
    
Observations 13,150 13,150 13,150  
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Table 5: Industry-Adjusted R&D Intensity for Multiple-Segment Firms 
 
Average and median industry-adjusted R&D intensity by number of industry segments. Industry-adjusted values 
computed by subtracting from each firm-year a sales-weighted average of the median industry values corresponding 
to each of the firm’s segments in that year. ***, **, and * indicate the reported value is statistically different from 
zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
  
 
 
segments  
 
 
All multiple- 
segment firms 
 
  
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 or more         
 
1980–97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
  
 
mean 
 
−0.009 
 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
−0.010
 
***
 
−0.010
 
***
 
−0.007
 
***
 
−0.008 
 
*** 
 
−0.006
 
***  
median 
 
−0.005 
 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
−0.004
 
***
 
−0.006
 
***
 
−0.003
 
***
 
−0.004 
 
*** 
 
−0.004
 
***  
std dev 
 
0.029 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.033
 
 
 
0.027
 
 
 
0.030
 
 
 
0.032 
 
 
 
0.020
 
  
n 
 
5,790 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1,702
 
 
 
1,587
 
 
 
1,212
 
 
 
692 
 
 
 
597
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
1980 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
  
 
mean 
 
−0.006 
 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
−0.004
 
** 
 
−0.006
 
***
 
−0.006
 
***
 
−0.009 
 
*** 
 
−0.006
 
  
median 
 
−0.005 
 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
−0.003
 
** 
 
−0.004
 
***
 
−0.007
 
***
 
−0.007 
 
*** 
 
−0.006
 
**  
std dev 
 
0.021 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.026
 
 
 
0.021
 
 
 
0.017
 
 
 
0.014 
 
 
 
0.015
 
  
n 
 
346 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
128
 
 
 
103
 
 
 
66
 
 
 
30 
 
 
 
19
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
1985 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
mean 
 
−0.012 
 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
−0.014
 
***
 
−0.009
 
***
 
−0.013
 
***
 
−0.006 
 
 
 
−0.003
 
  
median 
 
−0.008 
 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
−0.008
 
***
 
−0.006
 
***
 
−0.011
 
***
 
−0.005 
 
 
 
−0.005
 
  
std dev 
 
0.046 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.062
 
 
 
0.025
 
 
 
0.026
 
 
 
0.021 
 
 
 
0.021
 
  
n 
 
401 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
186
 
 
 
103
 
 
 
76
 
 
 
21 
 
 
 
15
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
1990 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
mean 
 
−0.007 
 
** 
 
 
 
 
 
−0.001
 
 
 
−0.014
 
***
 
−0.010
 
***
 
−0.008 
 
 
 
−0.005
 
  
median 
 
−0.007 
 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
−0.005
 
***
 
−0.009
 
***
 
−0.006
 
***
 
−0.010 
 
** 
 
−0.006
 
  
std dev 
 
0.062 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.087
 
 
 
0.030
 
 
 
0.024
 
 
 
0.028 
 
 
 
0.024
 
  
n 
 
458 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
203
 
 
 
126
 
 
 
76
 
 
 
30 
 
 
 
23
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
1995 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
mean 
 
−0.013 
 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
−0.017
 
***
 
−0.009
 
***
 
−0.003
 
 
 
−0.009 
 
** 
 
−0.010
 
**  
median 
 
−0.006 
 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
−0.008
 
***
 
−0.006
 
***
 
−0.002
 
 
 
−0.007 
 
*** 
 
−0.005
 
*  
std dev 
 
0.062 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.077
 
 
 
0.046
 
 
 
0.047
 
 
 
0.023 
 
 
 
0.025
 
  
n 
 
548 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
275
 
 
 
160
 
 
 
55
 
 
 
32 
 
 
 
26
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
mean 
 
−0.013 
 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
−0.012
 
** 
 
−0.007
 
 
 
−0.028
 
***
 
−0.035 
 
*** 
 
0.006
 
  
median 
 
−0.009 
 
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
−0.010
 
***
 
−0.007
 
***
 
−0.013
 
***
 
−0.013 
 
*** 
 
0.004
 
  
std dev 
 
0.095 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.104
 
 
 
0.096
 
 
 
0.067
 
 
 
0.070 
 
 
 
0.045
 
  
n 
 
827 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
399
 
 
 
260
 
 
 
89
 
 
 
52 
 
 
 
27
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Table 6: Panel Regressions of Industry-Adjusted R&D 
on Diversification and Control Variables, 1980–97 
 
Dependent variable is R&D divided by total assets, adjusted for industry by subtracting from each firm-year a sales-
weighted average of the median industry values corresponding to each of the firm’s segments in that year. Diversifi-
cation is measured as 1−H, where H is a sales-weighted Herfindahl index of diversification. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors given in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. The panel excludes firms with less than $100 million in annual sales. All specifications 
include year-fixed effects.  
 
 Total Within-firm Variance components 
     
Constant −0.0145*** 0.0203  0.0046  
 (0.0024) (0.0168) (0.0056 ) 
     
Diversification index −0.0141*** −0.0055*** −0.0076 *** 
 (0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0020 ) 
     
Log(sales) 0.0001  −0.0006   −0.0009  
 (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0007 ) 
     
Cash flow margin 0.1496*** 0.0178*** 0.0394 *** 
 (0.0083) (0.0045) (0.0013 ) 
     
Tobin’s q 0.0024*** −0.0001   0.0007  
 (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0006 ) 
     
R2 0.146  0.727  0.013  
     
Observations 12,096  12,096  12,096  
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Table 7: Cross-Sectional Regressions of Segment-Level R&D on  
Internal-Capital-Market Affiliation and Control Variables, by Segment Size 
 
Dependent variable is segment R&D divided by segment total assets. An indicator variable, “internal-capital-market 
affiliation,” is used to identify segments of diversified firms; the other observations are standalone firms. Sales and 
cash flow also measured at the segment level. Industry dummies (2-digit SIC level) included. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors given in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. 
 
 1980  1985  1990  1995   1999  
         
Panel A: Single-segment firms and smallest segments of diversified firms 
     
Constant 0.0203 ***  0.0280***  0.0395***  0.0679 ***  0.0799***
 (0.0066 ) (0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0068 )  (0.0101) 
         
−0.0074   −0.0036   −0.0127   −0.0322 ***  −0.0490***Internal-capital-market 
affiliation (0.0068 ) (0.0075) (0.0082) (0.0094 )  (0.0125) 
         
Log (segment’s sales) −0.0035 ***  −0.0044***  −0.0067***  −0.0121 ***  −0.0131***
 (0.0011 ) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011 )  (0.0016) 
         
0.0474 ***  0.0056  0.0165   0.0414 ***  0.0167  Segment’s cash flow 
margin (0.0169 ) (0.0116) (0.0138) (0.0107 )  (0.0103) 
         
R2 0.312  0.317  0.274  0.320   0.286  
         
Observations 498  870  1368  2372   1427  
         
         
Panel B: Single-segment firms and largest segments of diversified firms 
         
Constant 0.0165 ***  0.0278***  0.0383***  0.0664 ***  0.0806***
 (0.0064 ) (0.0060) (0.0063) (0.0067 )  (0.0101) 
         
0.0013   0.0030   −0.0027   −0.0125   −0.0131  Internal-capital-market 
affiliation (0.0063 ) (0.0065) (0.0072) (0.0085 )  (0.0117) 
         
Log (segment’s sales) −0.0034 ***  −0.0048*** −0.0065***  −0.0118 ***  −0.0131***
 (0.0011 ) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011 )  (0.0015) 
         
0.0652 ***  0.0241**  0.0199   0.0396 ***  0.0169* Segment’s cash flow  
margin (0.0174 ) (0.0116) (0.0135) (0.0107 )  (0.0102) 
         
R2 0.324  0.313  0.279  0.322   0.294  
         
Observations 513  898  1402  2398   1441  
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Table 8: Panel Regressions of Industry-Adjusted R&D on Diversification,  
Internal-Capital-Market Measures, and Control Variables, 1980–97, 
Multiple-Segment Firms Only 
 
Dependent variable is R&D divided by total assets, adjusted for industry by subtracting from each firm-year a sales-
weighted average of the median industry values corresponding to each of the firm’s segments in that year. Diversifi-
cation is measured as the natural log of the number of segments. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors given 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The 
panel excludes firms with less than $100 million in annual sales. Firm- and year-fixed effects included.  
 
 
Total Total Total 
    
Constant −0.0433*** −0.0451*** −0.0458 *** 
(0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0028 ) 
    
Log (number of segments) 0.0034*** ——— 0.0018  
(0.0009)  (0.0013 ) 
    
——— −0.0052*** −0.0053 *** Variance of imputed  
segment q  (0.0012) (0.0012 ) 
     
Log(sales) 0.0012*** 0.0019*** 0.0018 *** 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004 ) 
    
Cash flow margin 0.1078*** 0.1232*** 0.1228 *** 
(0.0068) (0.0077) (0.0077 ) 
    
Tobin’s q 0.0090*** 0.0092*** 0.0093 *** 
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008 ) 
    
R2 0.117  0.131  0.131  
    
Observations 5,426  4,317  4,317  
 
